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Abstract
By rigorously formalizing the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) argument, and Bohr’s re-
ply, one can appreciate that both arguments were technically correct. Their opposed
conclusions about the completeness of quantum mechanics hinged upon an explicit dif-
ference in their criteria for when a measurement on Alice’s system can be regarded as
not disturbing Bob’s system. The EPR criteria allow their conclusion — incompleteness
— to be reached by establishing the physical reality of just a single observable q (not of
both q and its conjugate observable p), but I show that Bohr’s definition of disturbance
prevents the EPR chain of reasoning from establishing even this. Moreover, I show that
Bohr’s definition is intimately related to the asymmetric concept of quantum discord
from quantum information theory: if and only if the joint state has no Alice-discord, she
can measure any observable without disturbing (in Bohr’s sense) Bob’s system. Discord
can be present even when systems are unentangled, and this has implications for our
understanding of the historical development of notions of quantum nonlocality.
Keywords: quantum information, entanglement, quantum discord,
Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen correlations, completeness, complementarity
1. Introduction
No paper is more seminal for the fields of quantum foundations and quantum infor-
mation than the 1935 Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen (EPR) paper [1]. It was the first
to discuss the correlations between the measurement results of two parties who share
an entangled state. Indeed, the term entangled was introduced by Schro¨dinger in the
same year [2], in a paper motivated (as Schro¨dinger explicitly notes) by the EPR pa-
per. In another paper of that year [3], Schro¨dinger introduced the term ‘steering’ to
describe the EPR-phenomenon, a notion which has recently been formalized in quantum
informational terms [4, 5], and shown to be a sort of quantum nonlocality intermediate
between entanglement and Bell-nonlocality. This last notion was of course introduced in
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Bell’s 1964 paper [6]. Although it sunk Einstein’s dream of a local deterministic theory
of quantum phenomena, it too was directly inspired by the EPR paper, being entitled
“On the Einstein Podolsky Rosen Paradox”.
In this paper, I show that yet another famous paper written in reaction to the EPR
paper introduced a concept of quantum nonlocality which has only relatively recently
been formalized (from an independent perspective [7, 8]) and which is of considerable
current interest [9–11]. The paper is Bohr’s 1935 response [12] to EPR, and the concept
is quantum discord, introduced in 2001 [7, 8]. I am using the term ‘quantum nonlocality’
here (and above) in a very broad sense, to refer to any phenomenon requiring at least
two parties who could be arbitrarily separated in space and who must share a quantum
state. Indeed, the term has been used (‘quantum nonlocality without entanglement’ [13])
for an effect that is intimately related to quantum discord.
Bohr famously gave his paper the same title as the EPR paper: “Can quantum
mechanical description of physical reality be considered complete?” But of course while
EPR answered this questions ‘no’, Bohr answered ‘yes’. There are different opinions
[14–17] about whether EPR, or Bohr, made logical errors in this debate, or whether (as I
advocate here) the disagreement can be understood as arising from EPR and Bohr using
different definitions. Under the latter scenario, their different definitions presumably
reflect their different conceptions of the nature of the world and our relation to it, and
one could still discuss whether Bohr’s or Einstein’s world view is to be preferred. It is
not the purpose of this paper to delve into such philosophical matters, but rather to
isolate the essence of the disagreement and to formalize it. As I will show, the most
reasonable formalization of the arguments of EPR and Bohr allow both of them to be
logically correct, with an explicit difference in one definition (that of disturbance) being
responsible for their different conclusions.
Quantum discord δ was defined by Ollivier and Zurek in 2001, as a “measure of the
quantumness of correlations” between two parties, Alice and Bob, who share a quantum
state [8]. Roughly, the Alice-Discord δ(β|a) quantifies the loss in the amount of quantum
information Alice’s system has about Bob’s system β which occurs when Alice makes
a projective measurement a on her system. In the same year, Henderson and Vedral
considered a similar quantity, without naming it, but required that it be minimized over
all possible (including non-projective) measurements by Alice [7]. This is now usually
taken as the definition of the discord of a state [9–11]. I show that the relation of
discord to Bohr’s 1935 paper is the following. If and only if the discord is zero, Alice can
measure any observable on her system in a way that does not disturb (in Bohr’s sense)
Bob’s system.
Because this paper uses a relatively large number of formal concepts, and employs
symbolic logical in some parts, it is helpful to introduce abbreviations for many of these
concepts. This is done in Sec. 2, which also contains some preliminary definitions used
later in the paper. In Sec. 3 I formalize the EPR argument, and also give a simplified
version which involves only a single observable qβ for Bob’s system. Then I formalize
Bohr’s counter-argument in Sec. 4 and show that it works against both the original EPR
argument and the simplified version. In Sec. 5 I show the relation between the EPR
argument and entanglement, while in Sec. 6 I show how Bohr’s notion of disturbance
relates to the notion of quantum discord. Section 7 concludes with a discussion of the
implications of this work, particularly in the light of Bell’s theorem.
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2. Notation and some definitions
2.1. Preliminary notation
Consider an experiment involving two parties, or agents, Alice and Bob. They can
freely choose between various actions, which can be regarded as controlling their mea-
surement settings. Following Bell’s notation [6], I will denote these a and b respectively.
These settings then yield outcomes A and B respectively (Bell’s notation). The prepa-
ration c (Bell’s notation) is the macroscopic event (or series of events) initiating the
experiment — apart from the measurement settings controlled by Alice and Bob — the
details of which remain fixed between one experimental run and the next. For c to have
any role in the correlations between A and B, it (or parts of it) must lie in the past light
cones of both A and B.
To connect to the language of EPR and Bohr, it is necessary to talk of systems. To
give this an operational meaning (that is, one grounded in macroscopic events), assume
that events a and A are locatable within a space time region α which is disjoint from
another region β containing b and B. We can then identify Alice’s and Bob’s systems
with α and β respectively. For simplicity I will assume that c lies in the backward light
cones of both α and β, which I denote t(c) < t(α), t(β). For Bell nonlocality, it is often
assumed that α is space-like separated from β, so that it is true neither that t(α) < t(β)
nor that t(α) > t(β). This arrangement was never assumed by EPR or Bohr, but is
certainly compatible with the physics they considered. EPR and Bohr talk about one
party (say Alice) making predictions regarding Bob’s system, so it does seem reasonable
to require that t(α)>t(β) not be true.
EPR also refer to physical quantities pertaining to systems α and β. I will denote these
by aˆ ∈ Pα and bˆ ∈ Pβ. I use a hat because in quantum mechanics physical quantities are
represented by operators, but there is no implication here that quantum mechanics must
be correct. Because there are many ways to measure a physical quantity, aˆ is associated
with an equivalence class of settings: a ∈ Saˆ, and similarly for bˆ and b. This equivalence
class will be defined formally below. Finally, I also define the set of possible outcomes
A for a measurement setting a ∈ Saˆ as Oaˆ and similarly for B. In the remainder of
this paper, unless otherwise specified, the symbol ∀ a is to be understood as meaning
all possible a; that is, ∀ a ∈ Saˆ for some aˆ ∈ Pα; and likewise for b, A, and B, mutatis
mutandis.
2.2. Some definitions
I can now present some basic definitions using the above events and variables.
Definition 1 (Phenomenon). A phenomenon φ ≡ (c,Pφα,P
φ
β) is defined by the com-
plete set of relative frequencies for the outcomes A and B:
{fφ(A,B|a, b, c) : A,B, a, b}
for some preparation c and for all physical quantities aˆ ∈ Pφα ⊆ Pα and bˆ ∈ P
φ
β ⊆ Pβ.
Here I am using the notation {f : g} to mean the set of values of f , where g is the set-
index, which ranges over all allowed values of g. I use the term ‘relative frequency’ rather
than ‘probability’ to emphasize that a phenomenon is something empirically observed.
Of course it may also be theoretically predicted, and in particular I will use the term
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quantum phenomenon for a phenomenon that is predicted by quantum mechanics. The
set of quantum phenomena will be denoted Q. An operational theory is a means of
calculating all the relative frequencies fφ(A,B|a, b, c) pertaining to given phenomenon
φ ≡ (c,Pφα,P
φ
β), and which postulates no variables distinct from the specified macroscopic
events. The notion of equivalence class of measurement settings is also operational, and
may depend upon the preparation c:
a ∈ Saˆ|c ⇐⇒ ∀ a
′ ∈ Saˆ|c, A,B, b,
[
fφ(A,B|a, b, c) =
∑
A′
fφ(A
′, B|a′, b, c)δA′,A
]
(1)
Orthodox quantum theory (OQT) is the example par excellence of an operational theory,
at least for a preparation procedure c corresponding to a pure state and sharp mea-
surements a and b (i.e. with rank-one probability operators [18]). This case is special
because it has a unique set of relative frequencies for all observers, as there are no extra
macroscopic variables that could be known to some observers but not others.
Next, we need to note that EPR use the terms description of physical reality and theory
interchangeably. That is, they did not use the term theory to mean operational theory.
Rather, they imagined that a theory could involve additional (hidden) variables, with
postulated relations between the variables that could not be derived from the preparation
c or observable relative frequencies alone. For the purpose of the debate between EPR
and Bohr, we need consider only a single phenomonen φ (as defined above), and hence
the class Θφ of theories describing this phenomenon. Thus,
Definition 2 (Theory). A theory θ ∈ Θφ for a phenomenon φ consists of
1. The set Λθc of values of λ.
2. A (non-negative) probability meausure dµθc(λ) on Λ
θ
c.
3. The (non-negative) conditional probabilities Pθ(A,B|a, b, c, λ)
which reproduces the phenomenon for all aˆ ∈ Pφα, bˆ ∈ P
φ
β:
∀ A,B, a, b,
∫
Λθ
c
dµθc(λ)Pθ(A,B|a, b, c, λ) = fφ(A,B|a, b, c)
EPR’s intuition was that the hidden variables λ could allow a better description of
physical reality than that given by an operational theory.
3. The EPR paper
The EPR paper grew out of decades of disquiet Einstein felt about quantum theory,
exacerbated by the rise of the Copenhagen interpretation as the orthodox one [16]. In
this paper I am not concerned with putting the EPR paper in the context of Einstein’s
earlier or later writings (unlike in [19]), but rather with presenting the formal argument
in the EPR paper itself quite rigorously (unlike in [19]). The reason, as I explained in
Sec. 1, is that it was at the level of formal argument that Bohr responded to the EPR
paper, and it is at this level that the connection to discord lies.
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3.1. The EPR criteria
The EPR paper is of course concerned with completeness and, as with almost all
concepts they introduce, they explain it reasonably precisely:
Whatever the meaning assigned to the term complete, the following require-
ment for a complete theory seems to be a necessary one: every element of the
physical reality must have a counterpart in the theory.
Here, and — except where noted — below, the italics are as in the original. This criterion
can be expressed using formal logic as
Criterion 3 (Completeness).
∀θ ∈ Θφ, Com(θ) =⇒
[
∀ bˆ ∈ Pφβ , EPR(bˆ|c) =⇒ Repθ(bˆ|c)
]
.
Here I have used Repθ(bˆ|c), standing for ‘is represented’, to denote EPR’s concept that bˆ
‘has a counterpart’ in theory θ, and EPR(bˆ|c) to mean that the property bˆ is an element
of physical reality. The notation used in the above requires some comment. First, I use
the notation EPR(bˆ|c), rather than EPRθ(bˆ|c) because EPR are quite clear that their
sufficient condition (see below) for something to be an element of physical reality must
come from the phenomenon, not the theory:
The elements of physical reality cannot be determined by a priori philosoph-
ical considerations, but must be found by an appeal to results of experiments
and measurements.
Second, the notation EPR(bˆ|c), rather than EPR(bˆ|a, c) should not be read to imply that
the reality of a physical property of system β is necessarily independent of the process of
measurements performed upon system α. However, as I will discuss below, the sufficient
criterion EPR use for EPR(bˆ|c) applies only in the case where the measurement a does
not disturb the system β. In this case, they are again clear that
No reasonable definition of reality could be expected to permit [that] the
reality of [properties of the second system] depend upon the process of mea-
surements carried out on the first system, which does not disturb the second
system in any way.
Thus in the case of interest, it must be the case that EPR(bˆ|c) = EPR(bˆ|a, c). Third,
EPR’s sufficient criterion (below) implies that it would be redundant to consider EPR(bˆ|b, c).
It would not, however, be sensible to consider EPR(bˆ|B, b, c), as this would make EPR’s
requirement of being able to predict the outcome (B) of the measurement completely
trivial. Since we can thus restrict to considering EPR(bˆ|c), it follows that we must re-
strict the conditionals to what ‘has a counterpart’ in theory θ in the same way. Thus we
obtain a local concept of representation, Repθ(bˆ|c), and thus a concept of local elements
of physical reality, which is critical to EPR’s argument [20].
EPR do not actually define what it means for bˆ to ‘have a counterpart in the theory’,
but I think it is uncontroversial to take it to imply that the outcome of any measurement
of bˆ is determined in the theory:
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Criterion 4 (Representation in the theory).
Repθ(bˆ|c) =⇒ ∀ B, b, λ, Pθ(B|b, λ, c) ∈ {0, 1} .
Regarding elements of physical reality, EPR stress that “[a] comprehensive definition of
reality is . . . unnecessary for our purpose.” Instead, they give the following sufficient
criterion:
If, without in any way disturbing a system, we can predict with certainty (i.e.,
with probability equal to unity) the value of a physical quantity, then there
exists an element of physical reality corresponding to this physical quantity.
To enable a non-disturbing measurement on β they consider an indirect measurement
(i.e. a measurement on another system α), so formally we have:
Criterion 5 (Element of Physical Reality).
EPR(bˆ|c)⇐= ∃ a : [ ¬Dist(β|a, c) ∧ Pre(bˆ|a, c) ].
Here Dist(β|a, c) means that the measurement a disturbs the system β, while Pre(bˆ|a, c)
means that the measurement a makes the value of bˆ predictable. Like representation,
predictability1 can be defined uncontroversially:
Definition 6 (Predictability).
Pre(bˆ|a, c) ⇐⇒ ∀ B, b,A, f(B|A, a, b, c) ∈ {0, 1} .
Note the use here of the operationally determined relative frequencies f , not the theory
probabilities Pθ. The second new notion — disturbance — requires clarification. EPR
say (with my emphasis):
A definite value of the coordinate [x], for a particle in the state given by
Eq. (2) [ψ(x) = e(2pii/h)p0x], is thus not predictable, but may be obtained only
by direct measurement. Such a measurement however disturbs the particle
and thus alters its state. After the coordinate is determined, the particle will
no longer be in the state given by Eq. (2).
Here by ‘state’ EPR obviously mean the particle’s quantum state — its state according
to OQT 2. We can avoid referring to quantum theory (as has been the case with my
1Note that it is important to distinguish between predictability and determinism; see e.g. Ref. [21].
2 On the basis of other passages in the EPR paper, a case can be made that EPR’s notion of
disturbance was meant to apply to the ‘real situation’ (to use one of Einstein’s later phrases) of a
system, not just its quantum state [R. Spekkens, private communication (2012)]. One could formalize
this by introducing a theory-dependence in the criterion for non-disturbance [i.e. ¬Distθ(β|a, c)] by
using the theoretical probabilities Pθ rather than the relative frequencies f . However one could not
simply substitute this for Dist(β|a, c) in Criterion 5 because that criterion uses, besides the disturbance
which is in question, only operational concepts, namely EPR(bˆ|c) and Pre(bˆ|a, c). However one could
replace ¬Dist(β|a, c) in Criterion 5 by ∃ θ : ¬Distθ(β|a, c), since every theory must reproduce the
operational predictions, so if there is no disturbance in some theory then there will be no disturbance
in the operational sense (the criterion I have advocated). Making this change would make no essential
change to my interpretation of EPR and Bohr because EPR do not justify the lack of disturbance from
examining the lack of change in either the relative frequencies, or the theoretical probabilities. Rather,
they justify it from the fact that “the two systems no longer interact,” as discussed in the main text.
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definitions so far) by recognizing that the state of system β in OQT can be identified
with a list of the possible relative frequencies of results B that will be obtained upon
performing measurements b. For a measurement a to ‘alter the state’ means that at least
one relative frequency is affected by choosing a rather than some other measurement
a′ (which could be the null measurement). Since EPR imply that the alteration of the
state follows from the disturbance of the system (the ‘particle’), it seems reasonable to
formalize their notion of non-disturbance as the sufficient criterion
Criterion 7 (No Disturbance a` la EPR).
¬DistEPR(β|a, c)⇐= ∀ a′, B, b, f(B|a, b, c) = f(B|a′, b, c).
Note the use of the EPR superscript here because later I will consider a different definition
for disturbance, that proposed by Bohr. If α and β are space-like separate, then no-
disturbance follows from Criterion 7 and the no-superluminal-signalling (from Alice to
Bob) assumption. EPR themselves make the stronger assumption, that “since at the
time of measurement the two systems no longer interact, no real change can take place
in the second system in consequence of anything that may be done to the first system.”
Presuming that ‘no real change’ must mean no disturbance (see again the preceding
footnote), it follows that EPR embraced the following
Assumption 8. Presuming ‘α and β no longer interact’ =⇒ ∀a, ¬DistEPR(β|a, c).
Thus if one disagreed with the operational Criterion 7 I have abstracted from the EPR
paper, one could replace it, without significantly affecting any of my analysis or conclu-
sions, with Assumption 8.
3.2. The EPR theorem
Having suitably formalized EPR’s definitions and criteria, we can now turn to what
they prove. It will be apparent that the two EPR criteria, for completeness and for
elements of physical reality, being necessary and sufficient respectively, are the minimum
required for proving the EPR theorem. By contrast, the logical argument EPR employ,
while correct, is unnecessary complicated. This must have contributed to Einstein’s
complaint that the paper, apparently written for publication by Podolsky, was ‘smothered
in formalism’ [22]3. Here I present a simpler, but logically equivalent, argument.
Consider the quantum phenomenon φ in which c is the preparation of a two-particle
entangled state, such that at some time t1, qˆα = qˆβ − x0, and pˆα = −pˆβ. Here the
subscript α (β) denotes the particle present in Alice’s (Bob’s) lab at the time of mea-
surement, which I take to be t1 in both cases. Following EPR, take the particles to
be ‘no longer interacting’, which will be the case if Alice’s and Bob’s labs are spatially
separate. Under these conditions it follows that (i) Pre(qˆβ |qα, c), because if Alice mea-
sures qα with result Qα, she can predict that if Bob were to measure qβ he would find
result Qβ = Qα + x0. It is also the case that (ii) ¬Dist
EPR(β|qˆα, c), because there is no
3The formal definitions and criteria I have used may also have been unpalatable to Einstein, but I
think are necessary to best appreciate Bohr’s argument. After all, Bohr wrote in response to the EPR
paper, not to any other, less formal but arguably clearer, statements by Einstein.
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signalling from Alice to Bob. From Criterion 5 it follows that (iii) EPR(qˆβ |c). By an
identical argument, it follows that (iv) EPR(pˆβ |c).
Now assume that (v) OQT is complete. Here I regard OQT, for a particular phe-
nomenon φ, as actually a set Oφ ⊂ Θφ of theories each of which uses only the concepts
of OQT (quantum states and operations). There might be some argument as to whether
EPR’s notion of completeness should be expected to hold when dealing with mixed states,
but in the present situation the EPR correlations defined above can pertain only for a
pure state, and indeed there is only one theory θ ∈ Oφ which yields these correlations.
Thus a defender of the completeness of Oφ must take this θ to be complete. Then, from
Criterion 3, and results (iii) and (iv) above, it follows that (vi) for this θ, Repθ(qˆβ |c)
and Repθ(pˆβ |c). By Criterion 4, this means that (vii) the theory θ determines both the
value of qˆβ and the value of pˆβ. However, (vii) is obviously false because in OQT a pair
of non-commuting operators do not have determined values under any circumstances.
Thus the assumption of completeness (v) is false:
Theorem 9 (EPR, 1935).
∃ φ ∈ Q : ∀ θ ∈ Oφ, ¬Com(θ).
Here Q is the set of all quantum phenomena.
As has been noted many times before — e.g. Refs. [16, 22, 23] — the EPR argument
can be made even simpler. Given the EPR correlations, and hence the unique OQT
θ which reproduces them, we do not need to consider a pair of observables at all. It
is enough to assume completeness, and derive Repθ(qˆβ |c), for example. To obtain a
contradiction, simply note that, in the EPR state, qˆβ does not have a determined value
(it in fact has an infinite uncertainty). If one does not assume that QM is correct, then
there is a motivation not to discard the non-commuting variables version [19], but for
the purposes of this paper the one-variable argument is just as good. Indeed, as we
will see in Sec. 4.2, the simpler argument helps to highlight the generality of Bohr’s
counter-argument.
4. Bohr’s Response
4.1. Formalizing Bohr’s counter-argument
Bohr’s response [12] to EPR’s incompleteness theorem is notoriously hard to follow
[15, 19, 24]. In the greater part of his reply, Bohr did not address the EPR entangled
state, but rather discussed the complementarity of properties of a single particle, as he
had previously done to defend the consistency of OQT against Einstein’s earlier attacks.
This defence was based upon the mechanical disturbance of the quantum system by the
apparatus, which was not obviously relevant to the EPR scenario since the incompleteness
lies in the quantum description of Bob’s system, which need not interact with any appa-
ratus. Bohr himself, when reviewing the Einstein–Bohr debates more than a decade later
[25], contrasted the ‘lucidity’ of the EPR paper 4 with his own “inefficiency of expression
which must have made it very difficult to appreciate the trend of the argumentation.”
4It must however be borne in mind that Bohr was writing this summary for a volume in honour of
Einstein’s 70th birthday.
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Despite this, I now believe (contrary to [19]) that Bohr’s counter-argument can be
interpreted as a precise rejection of one of EPR’s criteria, and that Bohr guides the
reader to this in his later review. There, Bohr again refers back to his earlier defences
of complementarity, summing up [25]: “As repeatedly stressed, the principal point is
here that such measurements [of complementary properties] demand mutually exclusive
experimental arrangements.” He then goes on to quote from his 1935 paper (truncated
here by me):
From our point of view we now see that the wording of the above-mentioned
criterion of physical reality proposed by Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen con-
tains an ambiguity as regards the meaning of the expression ‘without in any
way disturbing a system.’ Of course there is in a case like that just considered
no question of a mechanical disturbance of the system under investigation dur-
ing the last critical stage of the measuring procedure. But even at this stage
there is essentially the question of an influence on the very conditions which
define the possible types of predictions regarding the future behaviour of the
system. Since these conditions constitute an inherent element of the descrip-
tion of any phenomenon to which the term physical reality can be properly
attached, we see that the argumentation of the mentioned authors does not
justify their conclusion that quantum-mechanical description is essentially
incomplete.
With the word ‘ambiguity’ here, Bohr heralds that there are two possible ways way
to understand ‘disturbing a system’. In the short note in Nature [26] announcing his
forthcoming reply to EPR, in the first sentence of the abstract of that reply [12], and
in its introduction, Bohr identifies the supposed weakness of EPR’s argument as being
an ‘essential ambiguity’ in their criterion for physical reality. This again shows that the
‘ambiguity’ passage is key to understanding his rebuttal of EPR.
Bohr seems, quite reasonably, to associate the EPR notion of disturbance, Criterion 7
(or Assumption 8), with ‘mechanical disturbance’ and concedes that there is certainly no
disturbance of that sort on Bob’s system in the EPR scenario. But implicitly he rejects
EPR’s idea of disturbance as too narrow, and proposes a broader notion: a system β
is disturbed by a measurement a if that measurement influences the “conditions which
define the possible types of predictions regarding the future behaviour of the system.”
What is it that defines these possible predictions by Alice regarding Bob’s system β?
Nothing but the joint quantum state, modulo any reversible transformations on system
α. In operational (non specifically quantum) terms, a1 is non-disturbing if and only if
choosing to perform a1 — rather than a
′, say — does not preclude the possibility of
obtaining, via some subsequent measurement a2, the same information about β as would
have been yielded by the measurement a′: Of course we also want to avoid mechanical
disturbance, so we also require that a1 be non-disturbing in the EPR sense, and likewise
for a2 and a
′. Therefore for simplicity in the below I assume that there is no signalling
possible from α to β so that all a-type measurements are non-disturbing on β in the EPR
sense. This allows Bohr’s notion of non-disturbance to be formalized as follows (where δ
denotes the Kronecker δ-function)
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Definition 10 (No Disturbance a` la Bohr).
¬DistBohr(β|a1, c) ⇐⇒ ∀a
′, A1, ∃ a2 : [t(a2) > t(A1)] ∧
∀A′, B, b, f(B|A′, a′, b, c) = ∑
A2,A1
f(B|A2, A1, a2, a1, b, c)δA′,A2

 .
Some comments are in order. First, just as with the EPR notion of disturbance, I have
formulated Bohr’s notion in an operational way, with no reference to quantum mechanics
or any other theory. Second, in saying that a suitable a2 exists for all A1 I am allowing
for an adaptive measurement [18], in which the choice of the second measurement a2 may
depend upon the outcome A1 of the first measurement a1. Third, I have been a bit loose
with notation in using f(B|A2, A1, a2, a1, b, c), when my Definition 1 allowed only one
measurement for each party. I trust the reader can understand the generalization implied
by the new notation here. Fourth, I again stress that to avoid overly long expressions,
the above is to be understood to apply only when ¬DistEPR(β|a, c) for a ∈ {a1, a2, a
′}.
Bohr does not formally explain how his concept of disturbance impacts upon EPR’s
notion of physical reality, but it is easy to do so. The EPR argument relies upon
¬Dist(β|qα, c) being true. This is the case by EPR’s concept of disturbance, but not by
Bohr’s, as can be seen as follows. Consider, in the EPR scenario, if Alice were to mea-
sure pα instead of qα. This would give the conditional probability f(Pβ |Pα, pα, pβ , c) =
δ(Pβ + Pα). But if Alice does measure qα then this projects Bob’s state into a qˆβ-
eigenstate, with infinite momentum uncertainty. There is nothing Alice can do in her
lab anymore to enable her to gain any information about pβ ; there is no subsequent
measurement a2 she can perform such f(Pβ |A2, Qα, a2, qα, pβ , c) = δ(Pβ + A2). Thus
from Definition 10, ¬DistBohr(β|qα, c) is false. Consequently, with Bohr’s notion of dis-
turbance, qˆβ is not an element of physical reality, and the EPR incompleteness proof
fails.
4.2. Further commentary
Bohr’s response explicitly rejects EPR’s Assumption 8 that with non-interacting sys-
tems a measurement on one should not disturb the other. One could even formalize
Bohr’s conviction that the debate centred on an ‘essential ambuguity’ as a theorem:
Theorem 11 (Bohr, 1935).
∃ φ ∈ Q : ∃ a : ¬DistEPR(β|a, c) ∧DistBohr(β|a, c).
One could also epitomize Bohr’s response in terms drawing upon (but inimical to) EPR:
Any rational5 definition of reality must be expected to permit that the reality
of properties of the second system may depend upon the process of measure-
ments carried out on the first system, even when it does not disturb the
second system in any mechanical way.
5Here I have replaced EPR’s ‘reasonable’ (which is perhaps best understood to mean ‘locally causal’
[20]) by ‘rational’ since Bohr states [12] that EPR’s argument “discloses . . . an inadequacy of the cus-
tomary viewpoint of natural philosophy for a rational account of [quantum] phenomena.”
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It has been argued in Ref. [27] (p. 9), that Bohr was a radical positivist, identifying
reality with what can be known. My analysis of his position certainly seems compatible
with that conclusion. The authors of Ref. [27] further maintain that Bohr’s argument
against EPR boils down to precisely that which EPR had anticipated [1],
One could object to this conclusion on the grounds that our criterion of reality
is not sufficiently restrictive. Indeed, one would not arrive at our conclusion
if one insisted that two or more quantities can be regarded as simultane-
ous elements of reality only when they can be simultaneously measured or
predicted.
My analysis, by contrast, shows that the point on which he disputes with EPR is actually
more subtle, which can be best appreciated as follows. As noted in the last paragraph
of Sec. 3, the EPR definitions and criteria do not actually require one to consider the
simultaneous existence of qβ and pβ as elements of physical reality in order to obtain
a contradiction with the completeness of OQT from the EPR correlations. Deriving
EPR(qβ) alone is sufficient to obtain the contradiction. Thus if the thrust of Bohr’s
counter-argument had been to establish that EPR(qβ)∧EPR(pβ) cannot be true, it would
not work against the simplified EPR argument presented at the end of Sec. 3. Luckily for
Bohr, his actual argument, based on replacing EPR’s Criterion 7 of disturbance with his
own Definition 10, is sufficient to prevent the derivation of EPR(qβ) in itself, as noted
above.
In Einstein’s considered response to Bohr more than a decade later [28], he implicitly
rejected Bohr’s notion of disturbance in saying
One can escape from this conclusion [that orthodox quantum theory is incom-
plete] only by either assuming that the measurement of [α] (telepathically)
changes the real situation of [β] or by denying independent real situations as
such to things which are spatially separated from each other. Both alterna-
tives appear to me equally unacceptable.
Bohr’s equating of a disturbance of β with a change in what Alice could find out about
β via measurement of α, would seem to be an instance of the second of Einstein’s unac-
ceptable alternatives, namely ‘denying [an] independent real situation’ to β. It must be
noted however that this denial by Bohr was not special to a scenario with two spatially
separated systems; Bohr seems to have denied altogether that quantum things had ‘real
situations’ in Einstein’s sense. Schro¨dinger, by contrast, who clave to an intrepretation
of the wavefunction as both realistic and complete, was compelled to accept the first of
Einstein’s loopholes, the ‘telepathic change’ which Schro¨dinger called ‘steering’ [3], as a
“necessary and indispensable feature” of QM. But he found this ‘repugnant’ and hoped
that QM would be found incorrect in its prediction of steering [29], a hope which only
recently has been conclusively dashed by experiment [30].
5. EPR and Entanglement
EPR’s proof (using their notion of disturbance) of the incompleteness of OQT re-
lies critically on the existence of entanglement. Indeed, for any pure entangled state a
proof similar to EPR’s can easily be constructed if one forgoes the pair of complementary
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observables (as at the end of Sec. 3.2), and considers the observables aˆ and bˆ whose eigen-
states define the Schmidt basis [31] for the entangled state. These are the observables
such that a measurement of aˆ enables the results of a measurement of bˆ to be predicted
(and vice versa). In all of the early papers in quantum foundations, the states consid-
ered are pure. Nevertheless it is also easy to prove that even allowing for mixture, an
unentangled state cannot possibly be used to prove incompleteness from EPR’s axioms,
as I now show.
An unentangled quantum state (an operator on the tensor product of the α Hilbert
space by the β Hilbert space) by definition can be written as
̺c =
∑
k
℘c(k) ρ
α
k ⊗ ρ
β
k , (2)
where ℘c(k) is a probability distribution and ρ
α
k and ρ
β
k are also quantum states. In
this case, a measurement on system α will update the state of system β in a purely
classical way, from
∑
k ℘c(k)ρ
β
k to
∑
k ℘(k|A, a)ρ
β
k , where ℘(k|A, a) is determined via
Bayes theorem from ℘c(k) and the properties of aˆ and ρ
α
k .
Now if the EPR argument is to work there must be observables such that a measure-
ment of aˆ enables the results of a measurement of bˆ to be predicted. This will be possible
only if there is a decomposition of the form (2) where each ρβk is an eigenoperator of bˆ;
that is, bˆρβk = B(k)ρ
β
k . Then, if and only if ρ
α
kρ
α
k′ = 0 whenever B(k) 6= B(k
′), there
exists a measurement a that allows Alice to predict bˆ perfectly. In this case, one can
derive, following the EPR argument, the result EPR(bˆ|c). However, unlike in the pure
entangled case, there is, even for bˆ nontrivial, no contradiction with the assumption of
completeness: there is a θ ∈ Oφ in which bˆ is represented. It is the version of OQT
which interprets the index k in Eq. (2) as a variable in the theory, a variable like λ in the
Definition 2, with
∫
Λθ
c
dµθc(λ) →
∑
k ℘c(k). This version of OQT is the one which takes
the appropriate mixture (2) to be a proper mixture [32]. Then, from the Definition 4,
Repθ(bˆ|c) is true, since bˆ has a definite value given k, namely B(k).
Of course there are other OQTs, in particular the one in which there are no variables
in the theory apart from the ̺c which is uniquely specified by the preparation c, so that
all decompositions (2) are regarded as improper mixtures [32]. This particular θ ∈ Oφ is
provably incomplete according to EPR’s definition of disturbance. Moreover, adopting
Bohr’s definition of disturbance does not necessarily save the day in this case. That is,
there are cases where Bohr would also be forced to say that there is no disturbance, as I
will discuss at the end of the following section. Thus, unless one believes that Bohr would
have allowed that OQT is incomplete, one must accept that the question of incomplete-
ness of OQT should be answered negatively only if every θ ∈ Oφ is incomplete
6. This
incompleteness for all versions OQT is of course what EPR did prove (again according
to their definition of disturbance), but what we have seen here is that entanglement is
necessary (and, if pure, sufficient) for the EPR Theorem 9.
6The situation is similar to that in classical physics. There are some classical physical theories, such
as thermodynamics, that are incomplete in that they do not postulate any microscopic variables. But
that does not mean that classical physics per se is incomplete.
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6. Bohr and Discord
Given the discussion in the preceding section on the criticality of entanglement for the
EPR theorem, it might be expected that entanglement is equally critical for Theorem 11
(which I have called Bohr’s theorem), that there are quantum phenomena in which even
though mechanical disturbance is excluded, a measurement on α can still Bohr-disturb
system β. Surprisingly, this is not the case. Rather, it turns out that what is critical
to Bohr’s theorem is the existence of quantum discord. Note that in this section I am
concerned with Bohr’s non-mechanical disturbance in itself, not its role in his counter-
agument to EPR, which has already been treated in Sec. 4. I will return to the EPR-Bohr
debate in Sec. 7
As explained briefly in the introduction, discord was a term introduced by Ollivier and
Zurek [8] in 2001 as a quantitative property of a quantum state ̺c shared between two
parties (say Alice and Bob), only one of which (say Alice) may perform a measurement
a. They defined Alice-discord as
δ(β|a, c) = I(β : α|c)− J(β|a, c), (3)
where I is the quantum mutual information between Alice’s quantum system α and Bob’s
β, and J is the average information Alice has about β from the result of her measurement
a (and her knowledge that the original shared state was ̺c). In classical information
theory Alice’s measurement could simply reveal the configuration of her system in which
case the difference δ between would be zero by definition. In quantum information theory
this is not the case, and for some states ̺c, the Alice-discord δ(β|a, c) is nonzero for all
possible measurements. Henderson and Vedral had previously introduced this quantity
without naming it, and considered its minimum over all possible measurements, which I
will denote δ(β|c).
The proofs below do not use the magnitude of discord, only whether it is nonzero,
which I notate by
Definition 12 (Discord).
Disc(β|c) ⇐⇒ δ(β|c) > 0.
Now it is well known that Disc(β|c) is false if and only if
̺c =
∑
j
℘c(j) π
α
j ⊗ ρ
β
j , (4)
where ℘c(j) is a probability distribution, the π
α
j s are mutually orthogonal rank-one
projectors, and the ρβj s are simply normalized states with no other restrictions. This is
of course an unentangled state, so from Sec. 5 any measurement by Alice on such a state
would result in classical updating of her knowledge of Bob’s state. We now show how
Alice-discord is intimately related to Bohr’s notion of disturbance, in that
∀ φ ∈ Q,
[
¬Disc(β|c) ⇐⇒ ∀ aˆ, ∃ a ∈ Saˆ|c : ¬Dist
Bohr(β|a, c)
]
. (5)
To prove the forward implication, assume that Disc(β|c) is false. Then one way in
which Alice can measure an observable aˆ1 is as follows. First she measures the observable
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aˆc for which π
α
j are eigenoperators. This would update her knowledge of Bob’s state to
ρ
β
j for some j, and, if done by projection, would leave her system in the corresponding
state παj . On average, (that is, ignoring the result Ac which stores the value j) this
measurement has no affect on the state. Thus Alice can then measure aˆ1 by any other
means as if she had never measured aˆc, and update her knowledge of β thereby. But
then recalling the result Ac she can restore the initial state of the system by re-preparing
her system in state παj again, and then again forgetting Ac. Thus with the trivial choice
a2 = a
′, a subsequent measurement of a2 will yield the same information as if the
measurement of a′ had been performed instead of a1. In other words, by the Definition
10, this measurement of a1 is non-disturbing.
Now to prove the reverse implication, assume instead that all observables aˆ can be
measured without Bohr-disturbing the system β. For a quantum system, this means
that any aˆ can be measured in a way that (once the result is forgotten) the joint system
is left in the same state ̺c. This is only possible if the algebra of observables on α is
effectively classical, with no non-commuting structure. The state (4) is simply the way
to write this classicality in quantum terms. Thus it must be the case that the joint state
is Alice-concordant, with δ(β|c) = 0. Rewriting (5) in positive terms, we can thus state
Theorem 13.
∀ φ ∈ Q,
[
Disc(β|c) ⇐⇒ ∃ aˆ : ∀ a ∈ Saˆ|c, Dist
Bohr(β|a, c)
]
That is, if and only if the joint state is Alice-discordant (with δ(β|c) > 0) then there is
some α-observable such that the measurement thereof necessarily disturbs Bob’s system
β.
The discord δ(β|a, c) as defined in Eq. (3) can be thought of as the minimum amount
of quantum information about β that is irrevocably lost when Alice performs a measure-
ment a. The loss occurs precisely because by choosing a particular measurement, Alice is
eliminating “possible types of predictions regarding the future behaviour of the system”.
The discord δ(β|c) is in fact a quantification, in bits, of Bohr’s non-mechanical distur-
bance, the extent to which the measurement a influences “the very conditions which
define the possible types of predictions”.
It is the complementarity of different observables, the fact that they “demand mutu-
ally exclusive experimental arrangements” [12], that is the essence of the phenomenon of
discord, and makes Bohr’s notion of non-mechanical disturbance non-trivial. The trivial
aspect to Bohr’s notion is that any measurement a can be disturbing, according to the
Definition 10: simply by destroying the system α Alice will lose information about the
distant system β. The non-trivial point is that, for a suitable state, complementarity can
make this disturbance inevitable for at least one observable aˆ. In fact, it is a plausible
conjecture that for a discordant state disturbance is inevitable for all observables aˆ with
non-degenerate eigenvalues.
The role of complementarity in classifying bipartite quantum states has previously
been discussed in Refs. [33, 34]. However both of these papers considered the question
of whether complementarity could play any role in the system at all, and concluded that
it did not only when the system was of the form
̺c =
∑
j
℘c(j) π
α
j ⊗ π
β
j , (6)
14
where the πβj are also mutually orthogonal rank-one projectors. These are simply states
that are both Alice-concordant and Bob-concordant and may be called consonant states
(in that they have zero dissonance [35]). While these conclusions are certainly valid,
in the context of understanding Bohr’s notion of disturbance it is more enlightening to
concentrate upon the asymmetric notion of discord, just as for understanding the EPR
phenomenon it is useful to introduce the asymmetric notion of steering. The reason is the
same: both EPR and Bohr were interested in the consequences, for one system (Bob’s),
of making a measurement upon a distant second system (Alice’s).
Although not central to the discussion, it is worth highlighting the hierarchy of the
nonlocality concepts relating to bipartite states which have been mentioned in this paper:
Bell-nonlocality =⇒ steering =⇒ entanglement =⇒ discord =⇒ dissonance
Note that for the asymmetric concepts (steering and discord), the implications apply
regardless of which party we specify it for. Note also that all of these implications are
strict (the converse implications are false). Finally, returning to the point at the end of
Sec. 5, it is for the case of (non-product) consonant states that there exists a (non-trivial)
element of physical reality bˆ by the EPR Criterion 5, whether by EPR’s or Bohr’s notion
of disturbance. This is because such states have perfect correlations in the bases used in
Eq. (6) and yet, being concordant, there is no disturbance a` la Bohr.
7. Discussion
I have suggested that both the EPR argument, and Bohr’s counter-argument, can be
better appreciated by attempting a rigorous formulation. In particular, my formalization
allows us to see that both were correct, and that their differing conclusions about the
completeness of quantum mechanics hinged upon a differing conception of disturbance.
For EPR, as long as two quantum systems no longer interact, a measurement performed
by Alice’s has no measurable effect on Bob’s potential outcomes, and so does not dis-
turb Bob’s system. For Bohr, if Alice’s measurement alters the possible predictions she
could otherwise have made regarding Bob’s potential outcomes then that amounts to
a disturbance of Bob’s sytem. I have shown that Bohr’s concept is intimately related
to the concept of quantum discord, in that if and only if the state they share has no
Alice-discord, there is a way for her to measure any observable in a way that entails no
disturbance of Bob’s system, in Bohr’s sense.
As originally introduced, discord was a quantitative measure of the necessary loss of
quantum information about Bob’s system when Alice performs a measurement. Such
a quantification is only possible when an information theory exists. This is the case
for classical probabilities and for quantum states and measurements. For more general
theories, such as Spekkens’ toy-bit theory [36], and the PR-box theory [37], this is not
necessarily the case. In this context, the present work shows that it is still possible to
consider the presence or absence of discord by using the operational notion of Bohr-
disturbance. In particular, in toy-bit theory, at least for the case of a few toy-bits each
held by Alice and Bob, it is not possible to exhibit disturbance in Bohr’s sense for LOCC-
preparable bipartite states (that is, states that can be prepared from uncorrelated states
by local operations and classical communication — here via a toy-bit channel which
decoheres in a particular basis, so to speak — between Alice and Bob).
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Returning now to quantum mechanics, the situation is unlike that of the toy the-
ory, as there definitely exist non-entangled (and thus LOCC-preparable) states that are
discordant. As I have argued in Sec. 5, entanglement is a necessary property, and pure
entanglement a sufficient property, of quantum states for a proof of incompleteness using
EPR’s definitions. By contrast, discord is the necessary and sufficient phenomenon that
underpins Bohr’s counter-argument. Thus there is no evidence in Bohr’s reply that he
engaged with the EPR phenomenon of steering, nor with the concept of entanglement
which it relies upon.
EPR’s result (Theorem 9) states that orthodox quantum theory is incomplete, by
EPR’s necessary criterion for completeness that all elements of physical reality are repre-
sented in the theory. Now the existence of elements of physical reality is an operational
concept for EPR, and for maximally entangled states [31] all properties of β would be
elements of physical reality by this definition, because Alice can predict any property of β
by measuring her system in the appropriate basis. Likewise for such states all properties
of α would be elements of physical reality. Thus, in a complete theory, these should be
represented, by having values determined by the theory, independent of measurements
made on the other system — see Sec. 3.1. The impossibility of such a local representa-
tion, in any theory, for the correlations of maximally entangled qubit states, was exactly
what Bell proved in 1964 [6]. That is, Bell’s 1964 theorem can be stated, in precisely
EPR’s terms, as:
Theorem 14 (Bell, 1964).
∃ φ ∈ Q : ∀ θ ∈ Θφ, ¬Com
EPR(θ).
Here I use the EPR superscript on ComEPR(θ) to emphasize that this is EPR’s notion of
completeness, and in particular uses EPR’s criterion for disturbance, not Bohr’s.
If Bell’s theorem had been intuited by Bohr then it would of course have been the
perfect response to the EPR paper: “Your criterion for completeness implies that no
theory for quantum phenomena can provide a complete description. So you must admit
that either your concept of completeness is misguided, or that your conviction that ‘such a
theory is possible’ [1] is mistaken.” The present work militates against the plausibility of
an alternate history such as this (or that in Ref. [21]). The structure of Bohr’s response
to EPR is in no way anticipatory of Bell-nonlocality. Rather, Bohr’s argument relied
upon the phenomenon of quantum discord, a notion of quantum correlations with no
requirement for entanglement, or steering, let alone Bell-nonlocality. It is no coincidence
that Schro¨dinger, who coined the terms entanglement and steering, and Bell, whose
theorem overshadows all of the 1935 papers, were followers of Einstein, not Bohr.
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